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Clerk of the Court
U t a h Court o f Appeals
P.O. B o x 140230

Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230
Re:

YESCO v. UDOT, 2005 UT App. 169, No. 20040265-CA
Errata in Petition for Rehearing

To Whom it May Concern:
There are three errors in Appellee Utah Department of Transportation's recently filed Petition for
Rehearing. First, Appellee miscited subsection (h) of 23 U.S.C. § 131 on page 1. The correct
reference is 23 U.S.C. § 131(d). Second, the word "standards" is missing from the same sentence.
Finally, the general reference to 23 C.F.R. Part 750 on page 2 should have specified Subpart G of
that Part, Sections 750.701 to 750.707. With all the corrections, that sentence should now read:
As a result of the opinion, the Department of Transportation
("UDOT") is left with an unworkable standard that, in this case
at least, uses interchange measurement standards in conflict with
the Utah Federal Agreement concerning outdoor advertising, the
Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131, particularly
subsections (d) and (r) therein, and the national standards
promulgated by the Secretary of Transportation, 23 C.F.R. Part
750, Subpart G, particularly Sections 750.701 to 750.707.
Petition for Rehearing at pp. 1-2. Appellee apologizes for these errors and felt it important to
bring these corrections to the Court's attention. Thank you for your careful consideration of this
matter.
Sincerely,

Mark E. Burns
Assistant Attorney General

cc: Heidi E. C. Leithead

160 EAST 300 SOUTH, FIFTH FLOOR • P O Box 140857 • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-0857 • T E L : (801) 366-0353 • FAX: (801) 366-0352
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY, INC.,

a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

APPELLATE CASE NO.

20040265-CA

v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

Defendant and Appellee.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REHEARING
The opinion in Young Electric Sign Company, Inc. v. Utah Dept of Transp., 2005
UT App 169, mistakenly relies upon a different version of Utah Admin. Code R933-23(2) than the rule at issue in the proceedings below. Further, the Court has
misapprehended the fact that the claimed "point of widening" in this case does not "begin
to parallel" other lanes of traffic at the location in question. A picture taken by Appellant
Young Electric Sign Company ("YESCO") demonstrating this fact is attached hereto as
Addendum B. As a result of the opinion, the Department of Transportation ("UDOT") is
left with an unworkable standard that, in this case at least, uses interchange measurement
in conflict with the Utah Federal Agreement concerning outdoor advertising, the Highway
Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131, particularly subsections (h) and (r) therein, and the

national standards promulgated by the Secretary of Transportation, 23 C.F.R. Part 750.
In light of its errors, should the Young opinion be withdrawn and further oral
argument granted?
ARGUMENT
POINT L

THE COURT'S OPINION IS BASED IN PART ON THE NEW
RULE THAT WAS NOT EFFECT IN THE PROCEEDINGS
BELOW,

The Court's opinion relies in part upon the new definition of "acceleration and
deceleration lanes" in Utah Admin. Code R933-2-3(2), rather than the old rule, which
was in effect in the proceedings below. Young Electric Sign Company, Inc. v. Utah Dept. of
Transp., 2005 UT App 169 f 11 and Addendum A hereto. The old rule did not include the
last sentence which states: "On ramps and off-ramps are part of the interchange and shall
not be considered an acceleration or deceleration lane under the Act or these rules." This
change became effective in March 2004.
One purpose for this rule change was to clarify Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-502(9).
The change was adopted in response to the argument that YESCO made in the district
court that large portions of the on-ramp could somehow be excluded from the interchange
for purposes of outdoor advertising control. Without the rule clarification, UDOT
maintains the old definition would have placed the state in violation of 23 C.F.R.
§750.707 and the Utah-Federal Agreement by allowing the movement of non-conforming
signs.

2

POINT II.

THE INTERSECTING LANE DOES NOT "BEGIN TO
PARALLEL" THE OTHER LANES OF TRAFFIC AT THIS
LOCATION - THE RESULT IS AN UNWORKABLE
STANDARD FOR OUTDOOR ADVERTISING
REGULATION.

The Court also mistakenly states that the Antelope Drive on-ramp "begins to
parallel 1-15" when, in point of fact, it does not. Young, at ^ 13 (emphasis added). See
Exhibit 2, Photos 1 and 2, attached to October 22, 2002 letter from M. Short to UDOT
Hearing Officer D. Miles (attached hereto as Addendum B (relevant photograph) and
Addendum D (complete letter with all original attachments)).1 As the Court can see from
Addendum B, this intersecting lane plainly does not "begin[] to parallel the other lanes of
traffic' at this point. See Utah Code Ann § 72-7-502(19).
UDOT's postion is that this intersecting lane (the Antelope Drive on-ramp) begins
to parallel other lanes of traffic at the location that UDOT and the court below have
described as the "point of pavement widening/' The Court's factual error2 creates and
unworkable standard making it impossible for the Department to determine where socalled parallel lanes, that are not truly parallel, begin in other on-ramps.
To the extent that Legislature's 2,640 foot limitation in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7502(19) or exclusion of acceleration lanes requires a different result, those provisions are
superceded by the standard for measuring interchanges set forth in the Utah-Federal

1

Exhibit 1 from the same letter was included as Addendum A in Appellant's Brief.

2

It appears this error was based in part on Appellant's representation at page 18 of
its intial brief.
3

Agreement. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-515(2)("The provisions of this part are subject
to and shall be superseded by conflicting provisions of the Utah-Federal Agreement.");
Utah Admin. Code R933-5-2 (incorporating the Utah-Federal Agreement, Section
III.A.2.(b) ("No sign may be located on an interstate highway or freeway within 500 feet
of an interchange, or intersection at grade, or rest area (measured along the interstate
highway or freeway from the sign to the nearest point of the beginning or ending of
pavement widening at the exit from or entrance to the main-traveled way). It is notable
that this standard requires that the measurement begin at the sign to determine the nearest
pavement widening created by an on-ramp or off-ramp.
CONCLUSION AND CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH
For the foregoing reasons, UDOT respectfully requests that the Court take these
legal and factual errors into account, grant its Petition for Rehearing and set the case for
further argument, or revise its opinion accordingly.
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 35(a), counsel for UDOT certifies that this petition is
presented in good faith and not for purposes of delay.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of April, 2005.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

MARK E. BURNS
Assistant Attorney General

4

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing PETITION FOR
REHEARING was mailed this 28th day of April, 2005 to:
HEIDI E. C. LEITHEAD
PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE & LOVELESS
185 S STATE ST STE 1300
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
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ADDENDUM A

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

APR 1 h 2005

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Young Electric Sign Company,
Inc., a Utah corporation,

OPINION
'For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
State of Utah, by and through
the Utah Department of
Transportation,

Case No. 20040265-CA
F I L E D
( A p r i l 14, 2005)
2 0 0 5 UT App

169

Defendant and Appellee.

Second District, Farmington Department
The Honorable Darwin C. Hansen
Attorneys:

Heidi E. Leithead, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Mark E. Burns, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Jackson.
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
fl
Plaintiff Young Electric Sign Company (Young) appeals the
trial court's order denying its motion for summary judgment and
granting the Utah Department of Transportation's (UDOT) crossmotion for summary judgment. Specifically, Young argues that the
trial court erred by upholding UDOT's denial of Young's
application to erect an outdoor advertising sign. We reverse.
BACKGROUND
\2
In 1978, Young erected an outdoor advertising sign on
premises leased from the owner of real property located in
Clearfield, Utah, adjacent to Interstate 15 (1-15). Sometime
thereafter, UDOT constructed a freeway interchange nearby to
allow traffic on Antelope Drive to enter and exit 1-15 north of
Antelope Drive.
%3
In 2002, the property owner informed Young that it needed to
move the sign to the north end of the property in order to
accommodate development plans for the property. Young removed

the original sign and submitted an application to UDOT to locate
a new sign further north on the east side of 1-15, north of
Antelope Drive. After reviewing the application, UDOT concluded
that the proposed sign location was within 500 feet of the
interchange in violation of Utah Code section 72-7505(3) (c) (i) (A) . See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-505(3) (c) (i) (A)
(Supp. 2004). In particular, UDOT found that the proposed sign
location is 108 feet from the "point of the . . . ending of
pavement widening at the . . . entrance to the main-traveled
way." Id. Accordingly, UDOT denied Young's permit application.
f4
Pursuant to Utah Code section 72-7-508(4), Young filed a
complaint in Second District Court seeking de novo judicial
review of UDOT's decision. See id. § 72-7-508(4) (Supp. 2004).
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court upheld
UDOT's decision. Young appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
f5
Young argues that, in its ruling, which granted UDOT's
motion for summary judgment and denied Young's motion for summary
judgment, the trial court erroneously interpreted various
provisions in the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act (the Act). See
id. §§ 72-7-501 to -516 (2001 & Supp. 2004). "We review
questions of statutory interpretation for correctness, affording
no deference to the district court's legal conclusions." R.A.
McKell Excavating, Inc. v. Wells Farcro Bank, N.A. , 2004 UT 48,1(7,
100 P.3d 1159. Furthermore, "[i]n the context of a summary
judgment motion, we likewise employ a correctness standard and
'view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party.'" Id. (quoting
Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52,1|l0, 48 P.3d 235).
ANALYSIS
f6
The Act prohibits outdoor advertising signs within 500 feet
of an interchange. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-505(3) (c) (i) (A) .
The Act specifically provides, in relevant part, that
signs may not be located on an interstate
highway or limited access highway on the
primary system within 500 feet of an
interchange . . . measured along the
interstate highway or freeway from the sign
to the nearest point of the beginning or
ending of pavement widening at the exit from
or entrance to the main-traveled way.

20040265-CA
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Id. The Act defines "[i]nterchange" to "mean[] those areas and
their approaches where traffic is channeled off or onto an
interstate route, excluding the deceleration lanes, acceleration
lanes, or feeder systems, from or to another federal, state,
county, city, or other route." Id. § 72-7-502(9). In addition,
the Act defines the "[p]oint of widening" as "the point of the
gore or the point where the intersecting lane begins to parallel
the other lanes of traffic, but the point of widening may never
be greater than 2,640 feet from the center line of the
intersecting highway of the interchange." Id. § 72-7-502(19).
%1
UDOT argues that the "point of widening" defined in section
72-7-502(19) is not synonymous with the "point of the beginning
or ending of pavement widening" as used in section 72-7505(3) (c) (i) (A) . IcL §§ 72-7-502 (19) , -5 05 (3) (c) (i) (A) .
However, this interpretation renders the definition in section
72-7-502(19) meaningless. When construing statutes, we assume
that the legislature used each term in the statute or its
amendments advisedly; "thus the statutory words are read
literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or
inoperable." Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency, 913 P.2d 723, 727
(Utah 1995) (quotations and citation omitted). Because the exact
phrase "point of widening" is not used anywhere in the Utah Code
or the Utah Administrative Code, and variations of the phrase
"point of pavement widening" are used in both the Utah Code1 and
the Utah Administrative Code,2 we interpret the phrases as
synonymous.
f8
While the district court noted the applicability of section
72-7-502(19), it failed to properly apply it. In the court's
summary judgement ruling, it stated that under Utah Code section
72-7-502(19), the "point of widening" is defined as "either (1)
1
the point of the gore' in the case where there is no
acceleration lane, or (2) 'the point where the intersecting lane
begins to parallel the other lanes of traffic' where there is an
acceleration lane that does run parallel to the main-traveled
way." (Footnotes omitted) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 72-7502(19)).

1. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-505(3)(c)(i)(A) (Supp. 2004)
(stating that the placement of advertising signs are to be
"measured along the interstate highway or freeway from the sign
to the nearest point of the beginning or ending of pavement
widening at the exit from or entrance to the main-traveled way")
(emphasis added); id. § 72-7-505(3)(c)(ii) (same).
2. See Utah Admin. Code R933-2-12 (using phrase "nearest point
of pavement widening"); id. R933-2-13 (same); id. R933-2-3 (using
the phrase "nearest point of the beginning or ending of pavement
widening"); id. R933-5-2 (same).

20040265-CA
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^9
We agree with the district court that in places where there
is no acceleration lane and the interchange on-ramp immediately
"dies into the freeway," the "point of widening" occurs at the
"point of the gore."3 In other words, the point of widening is
where the on-ramp lane physically merges into the main-traveled
way. We also agree that in places where there exists an
acceleration lane, "the point where the intersecting lane begins
to parallel the other lanes of traffic" constitutes the "point of
widening." Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-502(19). However, because by
definition, "the point of widening may never be greater than
2,640 feet from the center line of the intersecting highway of
the interchange," id., the district court erred by ruling that
the point of widening occurs 2,937 feet from the center line of
Antelope Drive.4
iJlO UDOT argues, and the district court apparently concluded,
that there is no acceleration lane at this location and thus the
point of the gore, or the point of widening, occurs when the lane
proceeding northbound from Antelope Drive completely merges with
1-15. Young contends that an acceleration lane does exist at
this location and thus the point of widening occurs when the lane
from Antelope Drive begins to parallel the other lanes of 1-15.
Accordingly, we must determine whether an acceleration lane
exists in this case.

3. Black's Law Dictionary defines "gore" as either (1) "[a]
small, narrow slip of land" or (2) " [a] small (often triangular)
piece of land, such as may be left between surveys that do not
close." Black's Law Dictionary 703 (7th ed. 1999).
4. UDOT claims that our enforcement of the 2,640-foot limit, see
Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-502(19) (Supp. 2004), is contrary to the
Utah-Federal Agreement entered into between the governor of Utah
and the secretary of the United States Department of
Transportation's Federal Highway Administrator on January 18,
1968, pursuant to the Highway Beautification Act of 1965. See 23
U.S.C. § 131 (2005); Utah Admin. Code R933-5-2; see also Utah
Code Ann. §§ 72-7-501 to -516. We disagree. The core confusion
rather stems from where the analysis of section 72-7505(3)(c)(i)(A) begins. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7505(3)(c)(1)(A). UDOT begins the analysis at the sign and then
goes counter to traffic flow to find an "ending of pavement
widening." Id. We conclude that this defeats the purpose of the
Act, which is to protect the 500-foot area around an interchange
from advertising signs. We think Young's analysis, which begins
the application of the various statutory definitions from the
interchange at issue, better accomplishes the purpose of the Act.

20040265-CA
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fll The Utah Code does not define "acceleration lane."
the Utah Administrative Code defines "acceleration and
deceleration lanes" as

However,

speed change lanes created for the purpose of
enabling a vehicle to increase or decrease
its speed to merge into, or out of, traffic
on the main-traveled way. As used in the
Act, an acceleration or deceleration lane
begins and ends at a point no closer than 5 00
feet from the nearest point of the beginning
or ending of pavement widening at the exit
from or entrance to the main-traveled way.
On-ramps and off-ramps are part of the
interchange and shall not be considered an
acceleration or deceleration lane under the
Act or these rules.
Utah Admin. Code R933-2-3. Thus, an acceleration lane is a lane
constructed for the purpose of allowing a vehicle to increase its
speed to equal that of the traffic on the main-traveled way.
Ul2 UDOT would like us to assume that acceleration and
deceleration lanes occur only when there is a lane that travels
from an on-ramp to the next off-ramp without ever merging into
traffic on the main-traveled way. However, in the traffic rules
and regulations chapter of the Utah Code, the legislature has
defined this type of lane as an "auxiliary lane" not as an
"acceleration or deceleration lane." Utah Code Ann. § 41-653.5(1) (b) (Supp. 2004) (stating that a "general purpose lane"
does not include an "auxiliary lane that begins as a freeway onramp and ends as part of the next freeway off-ramp"). Further,
the Act also distinguishes between "auxiliary lanes" and
"acceleration lanes [and] deceleration lanes." Id. § 72-7502(12) (defining "[m]ain-traveled way" as "the through traffic
lanes, including auxiliary lanes, acceleration lanes,
deceleration lanes, and feeder systems, exclusive of frontage
roads and ramps"). Thus, the Act does not support UDOT's
interpretation. Therefore, because in this case there exists a
lane that meets the northbound lanes of 1-15 and then continues
on for 1,738 feet before finally merging into the outside lane of
1-15, its purpose must be to allow vehicles to increase their
speed to merge with 1-15 traffic. Accordingly, we hold that an
acceleration lane exists at this location.5

5. We also note that there are some locations where a freeway
on-ramp does not convert into an acceleration lane. In these
situations, the on-ramp immediately merges into the other lanes
of traffic and the point of widening occurs at the "point of the
(continued...)

20040265-CA
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fl3 The acceleration lane in this case begins at the point of
widening, or the point where the Antelope Drive on-ramp begins to
parallel 1-15, and extends 500 feet. See Utah Admin. Code R9332-3 ("As used in the Act, an acceleration or deceleration lane
begins and ends at a point no closer than 500 feet from the
nearest point of the beginning or ending of pavement widening at
the exit from or entrance to the main-traveled way."). Because
an acceleration or deceleration lane is not, by definition,
considered a part of the interchange, see Utah Code Ann. § 72-7502(9) (defining interchange as "those areas and approaches where
traffic is channeled off or onto an interstate route, excluding
the deceleration lanes, acceleration lanes, or feeder systems,
from or to another . . . route" (emphasis added)), in this case
the Act prohibits advertising signs within 500 feet from the
point of widening. See id. § 72-7-505(3)(c)(i)(A). Accordingly,
Young's proposed sign location is permissible under the Act as it
is 846 feet beyond this point.
CONCLUSION
fl4 We hold that the district court erred by granting summary
judgment to UDOT and denying Young's motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, we reverse.

Judith
Billinqs,
Judith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge

Hi5

v

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench,
Associate Presiding Judge

Norman H

5. (...continued)
gore." Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-502(19) (Supp. 2004). That,
however, is not the situation in this case as there exists an
acceleration lane as defined by the Utah Administrative Code.
See Utah Admin. Code R933-2-3.

20040265-CA
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ADDENDUM B

ADDENDUM C

DAR File No. 26893

NOTICES OF PROPOSED RULES

8.3.2 When a certificate of registration has expired for more
than one year, an application shall be made for an original certificate
as if the application was being made for the first time.
KEY: automatic fire sprinklers
ISeptembcr 3, 20031March 3, 2004
53-7-204
T

THE FULL TEXT OF THIS RULE MAY BE INSPECTED, DURING REGULAR
BUSINESS HOURS, AT:

TRANSPORTATION
PRECONSTRUCTION, RIGHT-OF-WAY
CALVIN L RAMPTON COMPLEX
4501 S 2700 W
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84119-5998, or
at the Division of Administrative Rules.

ACQUISITION

T
DIRECT QUESTIONS REGARDING THIS RULE TO:

Transportation, Preconstruction, Rightof-Way Acquisition

R933-2-3
Definitions
NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE
(Amendment)
DAR FILE No.: 26893
FILED: 01/14/2004, 13:49

James Beadles at the above address, by phone at 801-9654168, by FAX at 801-965-4796, or by Internet E-mail at
jbeadles@utah.gov
INTERESTED PERSONS MAY PRESENT THEIR VIEWS ON THIS RULE BY
SUBMITTING WRITTEN COMMENTS TO THE ADDRESS ABOVE NO LATER

THAN 5.00 PM on 03/16/2004.
THIS RULE MAY BECOME EFFECTIVE ON: 03/17/2004

AUTHORIZED BY: John R. Njord, Executive Director

RULE ANALYSIS
PURPOSE OF THE RULE OR REASON FOR THE CHANGE: This rule

amendment is designed to make the definitions comply with
federal law.
SUMMARY OF THE RULE OR CHANGE: The amendment clarifies

the definition of acceleration-deceleration lane, adds a
definition for feeder system, and deletes the definition for "outof-standard."
(DAR NOTE:
A corresponding 120-day
(emergency) rule that is effective as of January 14, 2004, is
under DAR No. 26892 in this issue.)
STATE STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR THIS

RULE: Section 72-2-501; and 23 CFR 750.707
ANTICIPATED COST OR SAVINGS TO:

• THE STATE BUDGET: The state does not anticipate any cost
increase or savings to the state from this change because it
does not require any different activity on the part of the state
than the state currently does.
• LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: The rule does not apply to local
governments; therefore, there are no costs or savings that
accrue to them.
• OTHER PERSONS: No costs or savings are anticipated to
result from the rule amendment because it does not require
any person to undertake any activity or change the
responsibilities they currently have.
COMPLIANCE COSTS FOR AFFECTED PERSONS: There would be no

compliance costs because the rule change does not require
anyone to do anything differently than they are doing now.
Since no one is required to undertake any new activity, there
should be no increase in costs.
COMMENTS BY THE DEPARTMENT HEAD ON THE FISCAL IMPACT THE

RULE MAY HAVE ON BUSINESSES: Because there are no costs as

a result of the rule change, there is no fiscal impact

UTAH STATE BULLETIN, February 1, 2004, Vol. 2004, No. 3

R933. Transportation, Preconstruction, Right-of-Way Acquisition.
R933-2. Control of Outdoor Advertising Signs.
R933-2-3. Definitions.
All references in these Rules to Title 72, Chapter 7, Part 5, are
to those sections of the Utah Code known as the Utah Outdoor
Advertising Act. In addition to the definitions in that part, the
following definitions are supplied:
(1) "Abandoned Sign" means any controlled sign, the sign
facing of which has been partially obliterated, has been painted out,
has remained blank or has obsolete advertising matter for a
continuous period of 12 months or more.
(2) "Acceleration and deceleration lanes" means speed change
lanes created for the purpose of enabling a vehicle to increase or
decrease its speed to merge into, or out of, traffic on the maintraveled way. As used in the Act, an acceleration or deceleration
lane begins and ends at a point no closer than 500 feet from the
nearest point of the beginning or ending of pavement widening at the
exit from or entrance to the main-traveled way. On-ramps and offramps are part of the interchange and shall not be considered an
acceleration or deceleration lane under the Act or these rules.
(3) "Act" means the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act.
(4) "Advertising" means any message, whether in words,
symbols, pictures or any combination thereof, painted or otherwise
applied to the face of an outdoor advertising structure, which
message is designed, intended, or used to advertise or inform, and
which message is visible from any place on the main travel-way of
the interstate or primary highway system.
(5) "Areas zoned for the primary purpose of outdoor
advertising" as used in the Act is defined to include areas in which
the primary activity is outdoor advertising.
(6) "Commercial or industrial zone" as defined in of the Act is
further defined to mean, with regard to those areas outside the
boundaries of urbanized counties and outside the boundaries of cities
and towns referred to in that subsection, those areas not within 8,420
feet of an interstate highway exit-ramp or entrance-ramp as
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120-DAY (EMERGENCY) RULES
An agency may file a

120-DAY (EMERGENCY) RULE when

it finds that the regular rulemaking procedures would:

(a) cause an imminent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare;
(b) cause an imminent budget reduction because of budget restraints or federal requirements; or
(c) place the agency in violation of federal or state law (Utah Code Subsection 63-46a-7(1) (2001)).
As with a PROPOSED RULE, a 120-DAY RULE is preceded by a RULE ANALYSIS. This analysis provides summary
information about the 1 20-DAY RULE including the name of a contact person, justification for filing a 1 20-DAY RULE,
anticipated cost impact of the rule, and legal cross-references. A row of dots in the text (
) indicates that
unaffected text was removed to conserve space.
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designated by the agency. A 120-DAY RULE is effective for 120 days or until it is superseded by a permanent rule.
Because 120-DAY RULES are effective immediately, the law does not require a public comment period. However,
when an agency files a 1 20-DAY RULE, it usually files a PROPOSED RULE at the same time, to make the requirements
permanent. Comment may be made on the proposed rule. Emergency or 120-DAY RULES are governed by Utah
Code Section 63-46a-7 (2001); and Utah Administrative Code Section R15-4-8.
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COMPLIANCE COSTS FOR AFFECTED PERSONS: There would be no
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RULE ANALYSIS
PURPOSE OF THE RULE OR REASON FOR THE CHANGE:

Section

R933-2-3 is the definitional section of the rule regarding the
regulation of outdoor advertising. The amendment to the
section is designed to take care of a conflict with federal law.
SUMMARY OF THE RULE OR CHANGE: The rule change adds a

clarification to the definition of acceleration-deceleration lanes,
a definition of feeder system, and deletes the definition of
"out-of-standard." (DAR NOTE: A corresponding proposed
amendment is under DAR No. 26893 in this issue.)
STATE STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR THIS

RULE: Section 72-7-501; and 23 CFR 750.707
ANTICIPATED COST OR SAVINGS TO:

• THE STATE BUDGET: The state does not anticipate any cost or
savings to the state from this change because it does not
require any different activity on the part of the state than the
state currently does now.
• LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: The rule does not apply to local
governments, so no cost or savings to them is anticipated.
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• OTHER PERSONS: None of the changes to the rule require
any cost, or provide for any savings, to other persons. The
changes do not require any persons to undertake any
activities that they are not now carrying out, so there is no
change in cost or savings.

compliance costs because the rule change does not require
anyone to do anything. Since no one is required to undertake
any activity different than what they now undertake, there
should be no increase in costs.
COMMENTS BY THE DEPARTMENT HEAD ON THE FISCAL IMPACT THE

RULE MAY HAVE ON BUSINESSES: There is no fiscal impact on

business.
EMERGENCY

RULE REASON AND JUSTIFICATION:

REGULAR

RULEMAKING PROCEDURES WOULD place the agency in violation

of federal or state law.
The Utah-Federal agreement does not allow for "out-ofstandard" signs.
THE FULL TEXT OF THIS RULE MAY BE INSPECTED, DURING REGULAR
BUSINESS HOURS, AT:

TRANSPORTATION
PRECONSTRUCTION, RIGHT-OF-WAY ACQUISITION
CALVIN L RAMPTON COMPLEX
4501 S 2 7 0 0 W
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84119-5998, or
at the Division of Administrative Rules.
DIRECT QUESTIONS REGARDING THIS RULE TO:

James Beadles at the above address, by phone at 801-9654168, by FAX at 801-965-4796, or by Internet E-mail at
jbeadles@utah.gov
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R933. Transportation, Preconstruction, Right-of-Way Acquisition.
R933-2. Control of Outdoor Advertising Signs.
R933-2-3. Definitions.
All references in these Rules to Title 72, Chapter 7, Part 5, are
to those sections of the Utah Code known as the Utah Outdoor
Advertising Act. In addition to the definitions in that part, the
following definitions are supplied:
(1) "Abandoned Sign" means any controlled sign, the sign
facing of which has been partially obliterated, has been painted out,
has remained blank or has obsolete advertising matter for a
continuous period of 12 months or more.
(2) "Acceleration and deceleration lanes" means speed change
lanes created for the purpose of enabling a vehicle to increase or
decrease its speed to merge into, or out of, traffic on the maintraveled way. As used in the Act, an acceleration or deceleration
lane begins and ends at a point no closer than 500 feet from the
nearest point of the beginning or ending of pavement widening at the
exit from or entrance to the main-traveled way. On-ramps and offramps are part of the interchange and shall not be considered an
acceleration or deceleration lane under the Act or these rules.
(3) "Act" means the Utah Outdoor Advertising A c t
(4) "Advertising" means any message, whether in words,
symbols, pictures or any combination thereof, painted or otherwise
applied to the face of an outdoor advertising structure, which
message is designed, intended, or used to advertise or inform, and
which message is visible from any place on the main travel-way of
the interstate or primary highway system.
(5) "Areas zoned for the primary purpose of outdoor
advertising" as used in the Act is defined to include areas in which
the primary activity is outdoor advertising.
(6) "Commercial or industrial zone" as defined in of the Act is
further defined to mean, with regard to those areas outside the
boundaries of urbanized counties and outside the boundaries of cities
and towns referred to in that subsection, those areas not within 8,420
feet of an interstate highway exit-ramp or entrance-ramp as
measured from the nearest point of the beginning or ending of the
pavement widening at the exit from or entrance to the main traveled
way mat are reserved for business, commerce, or trade under
enabling state legislation or comprehensive local zoning ordinances
or regulations, and are actually used for commercial or industrial
purposes, including the land along both sides of a controlled
highway for 600 feet immediately abutting the area of use,
measurements under this subsection being made from the outer edge
of regularly used buildings, parking lots, gate-houses, entrance
gates, or storage or processing areas.
(7) "Conforming Sign" means an off-premise sign maintained
in a location that conforms to the size, lighting, spacing, zoning and
usage requirements as provided by law and these rules.
(8) "Controlled Sign" means any off-premise sign that is
designed, intended, or used to advertise or inform any part of the
advertising or informative contents of which is visible from any
place on the main traveled way of any interstate or federal-aid
primary highway in this State.
(9) "Destroyed Sign" means a sign damaged by natural
elements wherein the costs of re-erection exceeds 30% of the
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depreciated value of the sign as established by departmental
appraisal methods.
(10) "Feeder systems" are secondary roads that bring traffic to
the main-traveled way.
[(4£)](11) "Freeway" means a divided highway for through
traffic with full control access.
f(-W](T2) "Grandfather Status" refers to any off-premise
controlled sign erected in zoned or unzoned commercial or industrial
areas, prior to May 9, 1967, even if the sign does not comply with
the size, lighting, or spacing of the Act and these Rules. Signs only,
and not sign sites, may qualify for Grandfather Status.
[f!2)}(T3) "H-l" means highway service zone as defined in the
Act.
[(L3)]Q4}MLease or Consent" means any written agreement by
which possession of land, or permission to use land for the purpose
of erecting or maintaining a sign, or both, is granted by the owner to
another person for a specified period of time.
[(44)]£L5J "Legal copy" means the advertising copy on the sign
that occupies at least 50% of the sign size.
[(45)](T6) "Nonconforming Sign" means a sign that was
lawfully erected, but that does not conform to State law or rules
passed or made at a later date or that later fails to comply with State
legislation or rules because of changed conditions. The term
"illegally erected" or "illegally maintained" is not synonymous with
the term, "nonconforming sign", nor is a sign with "grandfather"
status synonymous with the term, "nonconforming sign."
[fM>V|(T7) "Off-Premise Sign" means also, in supplement to tlie
definition stated in the Act, an outdoor advertising sign that
advertises an activity, service or product and that is located on
premises other than the premises at which activity or service occurs
or product is sold or manufactured.
[fj^)](18) "On-Premise Sign", in supplement to the definition
stated in the Act, does not include a sign that advertises a product or
service that is only incidental to the principal activity or that brings
rental income to the property owner or occupant. [
(18) "Out of Standard" means any sign that fails to meet the
standards and criteria set forth in the Utah Federal Agreement of
January 18, 1968 as referenced in the Utah Outdoor Advertising
Controls and Rules, current edition, or more restrictive statutes or
rules passed after as to size, height, lighting, or spacing.]
(19) "Parkland" means any publicly owned land that is
designed or used as a public park, recreation area, wildlife or
waterfowl refuge, or historical site.
(20) "Property" as used in the definition of "On-Premise Sign"
includes those areas from which the general public is serviced and
which are directly connected with and are involved in assembling,
manufacturing, servicing, repairing, or storing of products used in
the business activity. This property does not include the site of any
auxiliary facilities that are not essential to and customarily used in
the conduct of business, nor does it include property not contiguous
to the property on which the sign is situated.
(21) "Sale or Lease Sign" means any sign situated on the
subject property that advertises that the property is for "sale" or
"lease". This sign may not advertise any product or service
unrelated to the business of selling or leasing the land upon which it
is located, nor may it advertise a projected use of the land or a
financing service available or being utilized in its development.
(22) "Scenic Area" as used in the Act includes a scenic byway.
(23) "Transient or Temporary Activity" means any industrial
or commercial activity, not otherwise herein excluded, that does not
have a prior continuous history for a period of six months.
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CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
TITLE 23-HIGHWAYS
CHAPTER I-FEDERAL HIGHWAY
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION
SUBCHAPTER H-RIGHT-OF-WAY AND
ENVIRONMENT
PART 750-HIGHWAY BEAUTIFICATION
SUBPART G-OUTDOOR ADVERTISING
CONTROL
Current through June 16, 2004; 69 FR 33774

the duration of its normal life subject to customary
maintenance.
Preexisting signs covered by a
grandfather clause, which do not comply with the
agreement criteria have the status of nonconforming
signs.
(d) Maintenance and Continuance. In order to
maintain and continue a nonconforming sign, the
following conditions apply:
(1) The sign must have been actually in existence at the
time the applicable State law or regulations became
effective as distinguished from a contemplated use such
as a lease or agreement with the property owner. There
are two exceptions to actual existence as follows:

§ 750.707 Nonconforming signs.

(a) General. The provisions of § 750.707 apply to
nonconfonriing signs which must be removed under
State laws and regulations implementing 23U.S.C. 131.
These provisions also apply to nonconforming signs
located in commercial and industrial areas within 660
feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way which come
under the so-called grandfather clause contained in
State-Federal agreements. These provisions do not
apply to conforming signs regardless of when or where
they are erected.
(b) Nonconforming Signs. A nonconforming sign is a
sign which was lawfully erected but does not comply
with the provisions of State law or State regulations
passed at a later date or later fails to comply with State
law or State regulations due to changed conditions.
Changed conditions include, for example, signs
lawfully in existence in commercial areas which at a
later date become noncommercial, or signs lawfully
erected on a secondary highway later classified as a
primary highway.
(c) Grandfather Clause. At the option of the State, the
agreement may contain a grandfather clause under
which criteria relative to size, lighting, and spacing of
signs in zoned and unzoned commercial and industrial
areas within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the
right-of-way apply only to new signs to be erected after
the date specified in the agreement. Any sign lawfully
in existence in a commercial or industrial area on such
date may remain even though it may not comply with
the size, lighting, or spacing criteria. This clause only
allows an individual sign at its particular location for

(i) Where a permit or similar specific State
governmental action was granted for the construction of
a sign prior to the effective date of the State law or
regulations and the sign owner acted in good faith and
expended sums in reliance thereon. This exception
shall not apply in instances where large numbers of
permits were applied for and issued to a single sign
owner, obviously in anticipation of the passage of a
State control law.
(ii) Where the State outdoor advertising control law or
the Federal-State agreement provides that signs in
commercial and industrial areas may be erected within
six (6) months after the effective date of the law or
agreement provided a lease dated prior to such effective
date was filed with the State and recorded within thirty
(30) days following such effective date.
(2) There must be existing property rights in the sign
affected by the State law or regulations. For example,
paper signs nailed to trees, abandoned signs and the like
are not protected.
(3) The sign may be sold, leased, or otherwise
transferred without affecting its status, but its location
may not be changed. A nonconforming sign removed
as a result of a right-of-way taking or for any other
reason may be relocated to a conforming area but
cannot be reestablished at a new location as a
nonconforming use.
(4) The sign must have been lawful on the effective
date of the State law or regulations, and must continue
to be lawfully maintained.
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(5) The sign must remain substantially the same as it
was on the effective date of the State law or regulations.
Reasonable repair and maintenance of the sign,
including a change of advertising message, is not a
change which would terminate nonconforming rights.
Each State shall develop its own criteria to determine
when customary maintenance ceases and a substantial
change has occurred which would terminate
nonconforming rights.

23 CFR § 750.707
END OF DOCUMENT

(6) The sign may continue as long as it is not
destroyed, abandoned, or discontinued. If permitted by
State law and reerected in kind, exception may be made
for signs destroyed due to vandalism and other criminal
or tortious acts.
(i) Each state shall develop criteria to define
destruction, abandonment and discontinuance. These
criteria may provide that a sign which for a designated
period of time has obsolete advertising matter or is
without advertising matter or is in need of substantial
repair may constitute abandonment or discontinuance.
Similarly, a sign damaged in excess of a certain
percentage of its replacement cost may be considered
destroyed.
(ii) Where an existing nonconforming sign ceases to
display advertising matter, a reasonable period of time
to replace advertising content must be established by
each State. Where new content is not put on a structure
within the established period, the use of the structure as
a nonconforming outdoor advertising sign is terminated
and shall constitute an abandonment or discontinuance.
Where a State establishes a period of more than one (1)
year as a reasonable period for change of message, it
shall justify that period as a customary enforcement
practice within the State. This established period may
be waived for an involuntary discontinuance such as the
closing of a highway for repair in front of the sign.
(e) Just Compensation. The States are required to pay
just compensation for the removal of nonconforming
lawfully existing signs in accordance with the terms of
23 U.S.C. 131 and the provisions of Subpart D, Part
750, Chapter I, 23 CFR. The conditions which
establish a right to maintain a nonconforming sign and
therefore the right to compensation must pertain at the
time it is acquired or removed.

<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations,
or Tables>

23 C. F. R. § 750.707
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YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY

Ogden Division
801-621-4710 Telephone
801-399-9648 Fax

October 22, 2002

2767 Industrial Drive
P.O. Box 1880
Ogden, Utah 84402-1880

David Miles, Hearing Officer
Utah Department of Transportation
4501 S.2700W.
Box 141260
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-1260
RE:

Appeal of Departmental Action
UDOT File No. 02-1-3
R-407 Outdoor Advertising Application at MP 369.8 on Wayne Belleau Property

Dear Mr. Miles:
This is to follow up our telephone discussion on October 6. It is our understanding that
you are the hearing officer for the aforementioned appeal. The appeal was filed on
September 5, and it was our understanding that the procedure involves the department
sending us a letter advising us of the briefing schedule for the appeal. You had indicated
that Mark Burns with the Attorney General's Office would get that letter out to us right
away, yet we have not received it.
You may recall that this appeal involves an outdoor advertising structure that we are
seeking to relocate, and which has been removed. Accordingly, we are not receiving the
advertising income to which we are entitled, and are unable to meet our commitments to
advertisers during the delay. In order to avoid any further delay, we wanted to get before
you an analysis of the state regulations, and how they apply in this appeal. We also
discussed that, in view of the issues involved and to facilitate your review of the oversize
exhibits we have in support of this appeal, we have Requested an informal hearing with
you on the appeal.
The analysis of the issues on appeal are as follows:
This is an appeal from the August 15, 2002 decision by Luana Middleton denying our
permit application for relocation of an outdoor advertising sign on the above-referenced
property.

Historical Background
The subject sign has existed since 1978. Several significant developments have occurred
since the sign was erected that mandate its relocation. First, overhead electrical utility
high power lines were installed in very close proximity to the sign well after the sign was
erected. The power lines have created a risk of electrocution to our workers who change
sign faces and perform maintenance on the subject sign periodically, and we have had to
exercise great caution to deal with this situation. In a similar circumstance some time
ago, our company had a worker electrocuted who was working on an outdoor advertising
structure, so we are highly sensitive to such situations as they effect our employees.
During the last session, and with UDOT's recognition that the risk of electrocution was
significant, the Legislature passed a new law, S.B.145, to permit outdoor advertising
companies to relocate signs closer to utility lines than applicable electrical codes would
permit. This amendment to Section 72-7-516 was signed into law by the Governor in
March, 2002.
Another relevant factor is the on-ramp configuration for the northbound on-ramp and
acceleration lane adjacent to the existing sign location. The on-ramp was configured
differently when the sign was erected. It merged into the freeway at a much more
dramatic angle than it does now, impairing the ability of vehicles to get up to speed
before being forced into a merge. In response to this problem, the on-ramp was
reconfigured to angle more parallel to the through lanes before merging, allowing more
space for acceleration before the merge into the northbound through lanes. The on-ramp
now has an acceleration lane that slowly merges into the outer lane. From the point that
the pavement for the main-traveled way widens to merge with the pavement for the onramp/acceleration lane, the incoming lane takes a full 1,773 feet until the pavement
widening gradually ends.
In our efforts to relocate the subject sign to maintain the required separation from the
utility lines, we discussed relocation sites with the owner of the land. The property
owner made us aware that it was pursuing development on its land, such that the sign
would have to be moved to the north end of the site. Accordingly, we filed the
appropriate application forms with UDOT.
The Region One Permits Officer has misinterpreted the relevant state statutes and
administrative rules to arrive at the conclusion that the proposed relocation site does not
meet the spacing requirements from the interchange. In so doing, the denial of our permit
request put us in the position of losing our sign altogether, or risking electrocution of our
workers. It is clear that neither such result was the intent of the Legislature. The
relocation site is a permitted one under the relevant statutes and rules. To accommodate
the property owner, we are in the process of removing the existing sign. Accordingly,
and following an inordinate delay in the processing of our permit request, we were forced
to appeal this decision.

Statutory Analysis
The Permits Officer has interpreted the relocation site to be closer than permitted from
the interchange, which she interprets to include all of the on-ramp/acceleration lane up to
the point that the merging of the on-ramp/acceleration lane into the through lanes of the
freeway ends. This is a misinterpretation of the statute and administrative rules.
Submitted herewith is an aerial photograph diagramming the roadway and property
conditions in the area, as well as the existing and proposed sign location, for your
reference. See Exhibit 1. We have a full-size copy of this exhibit, and reiterate our
request for the opportunity to present this exhibit to you at an informal hearing or a
meeting of the parties.
Section 72-7-505(3)( c)(i)(A) provides that outdoor advertising signs may not be located
on an interstate highway "within 500 feet of an interchange". Ms. Middleton has
explained to us that she interprets the rule to prohibit any outdoor advertising until a point
500 feet beyond where the pavement widening for the on-ramp/acceleration lane ends. In
doing so, Ms. Middleton has effectively interpreted the on-ramp/acceleration lane, in its
entirety, to be part of the "interchange". This is in error. The statute defines an
"interchange", in relevant part, as follows:
"Interchange or intersection" means those areas and their approaches
where traffic is channeled off or onto an interstate route, excluding the
deacceleration lanes, acceleration lanes, ...
(emphasis added). Id., Section 72-7-502(9). The term "acceleration lane" is not defined
in the statute, but it is in the rule. R933-2-3(2) defines an acceleration lane as follows:
(2) "Acceleration and deceleration lanes" means speed change lanes
created for the purpose of enabling a vehicle to increase its speed to merge
into, or out of, traffic on the main-traveled way. As used in the Act, an
acceleration lane begins and ends at a point no closer than 500 feet from
the nearest point of the beginning or ending of pavement widening at the
exit from or entrance to the main-traveled way.
(emphasis added). Clearly, under the regulatory scheme, the acceleration lane cannot be
considered to be part of the "interchange". The crux of the issue is whether the
acceleration lane is measured 500 feet from the "point of beginning" of the pavement
widening, or the "point of ending". If it is the former, the proposed relocation site is a
permitted location. If it is the latter, it is not. However, the latter would lead to an absurd
result.
If the point of measurement were interpreted to be the point that the pavement widening
for the on-ramp/acceleration lane ends, the acceleration lane could not begin (under the
foregoing definition in the Rule) until a point 500 feet beyond where it ends. This
interpretation would render the Rule definition for an "acceleration lane" to be

meaningless, and nonsense. The point of measurement has to be considered to be the
beginning point of pavement widening, not the point where the pavement widening ends.
Under the statute, from the point of the beginning of pavement widening, the
"interchange" only continues for another 500 feet, at which point the incoming lane
becomes an "acceleration lane" under the language of the rule. From that point
northward, it may not be considered to be part of the "interchange" under the statutory
definition.
The "point of widening" is identified on the attached Exhibit 1 and depicted in the photos
attached as Exhibit 2, and is located 1164 feet from the center line of Antelope Drive
where it intersects with the freeway. From the beginning point of widening, the
"acceleration lane" begins, and the "interchange" ends, 500 feet to the north. See Exhibit
1. The statute provides that no outdoor advertising may be erected within 500 feet of the
"interchange", effectively setting up a sign-free zone for the first 500 feet after the
"interchange" ends. Both the existing sign, and the relocation site, are well outside of the
sign-free zone. See Exhibit 1.
In summary, the relocation site is a permitted location for an outdoor advertising
structure, being located in excess of 500 feet from the "interchange". We respectfully
request that you grant the appeal and approve the issuance of the permit as we have
requested.

Sincerely.^^

I

Matt Short
Outdoor Manager
Young Electric Sign Company
Attachments

.MP

ANTELOPE DRIVE
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EXHIBIT 1

Photo 1

Point of Widening (beginning) - aerial photo

Photo 2

Point of Widening (beginning) - ground level photo

Photo 3

Point of Widening (ending) - aerial photo

Photo 4

Point of Widening (ending) - ground level photo

Photo 5

Existing on-premise signs in area

Photo 6

Existing on-premise monument sign

Photo 7

Existing sign - prior to relocation

Photo 8

Relocation site

Area Photographs
EXHIBIT 2

